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Abstract: Whilst the political dust on mass surveillance is slowly settling down, what has 
become apparent is the uncertainty regarding the interpretation and application of the right to 
privacy norms under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
in the context of cyberspace. Despite the world-wide condemnation of these practices by, inter 
alia, the United Nations and international human rights organisations, little consensus has been 
reached on how to bring them in line with international human rights law. This paper proposes 
that the most pragmatic solution is updating Article 17 by replacing General Comment No.16. 
There are many issues that require attention. The paper focuses on two fundamental aspects 
of this process, namely the development of more detailed understanding of what is meant by 
the right to privacy in the 21st century, and the challenge posed by foreign cyber surveillance 
to the principle of extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. To that end, the paper 
identifies that the ‘effective control’ test, developed by international human rights courts and 
bodies adopted to determine jurisdiction, is unsuitable in the context of state-sponsored cyber 
surveillance. The paper considers a number of suggestions made by legal scholars, which hinge 
on the control of communications, rather than the physical control over areas or individuals. 
Such a ‘virtual control’ approach seems in line with the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, according to which extraterritorial obligations may arise when states exercise 
authority and control over an individual’s human rights, despite not having physical control over 
that individual. The paper argues that the ‘virtual control’ test, understood as a remote control 
over the individual’s right to privacy of communications, may help to close the normative gap 
that state intelligence agencies keenly exploit at the moment.
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21. INTRODUCTION
One of the starkest lessons to be learned from the 2013 Edward Snowden revelations is the need 
for a global solution regarding state sponsored communications surveillance,1 conducted in 
particular by the coalition of the so-called Five Eyes states.2 Undoubtedly, these activities breach 
the right to privacy of communications3 enshrined in Article 17 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR)4 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1950 (ECHR).5 However, despite numerous calls from international organisations and 
human rights courts and bodies condemning mass surveillance, to date there is no consensus on 
how to bring these activities in line with human rights law.
This paper will address some of these challenges, focusing on legal solutions within the existing 
international human rights framework, as achieving a legally binding agreement remains elusive. 
To that end, the first part will outline some recent developments from the United Nations (UN) 
organisations6 and human rights bodies;7 it will conclude that current state practice in the form 
of transboundary state-sponsored cyber espionage8 and long-standing disagreements regarding 
the future of Internet governance9 make the negotiation from scratch of a new UN privacy 
treaty for the digital environment unlikely. However, there are other solutions, discussed in part 
two, such as the long overdue modernisation of the existing privacy norms under Article 17 
ICCPR. The paper will focus on two important aspects of this process, namely the updating of 
the notion of privacy and the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties in the context 
of cyber surveillance. This part will outline the approach adopted in the international human 
1 For a definition of communications surveillance see UNHRC ‘Report by the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue’ (2013) UN Doc 
A/HRC/23/40, para 6. 
2 The Five Eyes comprises the US National Security Agency, the UK General Communications 
Headquarters, Canada’s Communications Security Establishment Canada, the Australian Signals 
Intelligence Directorate and New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau. 
3 UNGA, ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights the Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/37, para 20; Privacy International v Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKIPTrib 15_11-CH. 
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 17.
5 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (opened for signature 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222 (ECHR), art 8.
6 UNGA Res 68/167 (18 December 2013) UN Doc A/RES/68/167; UNGA Res 69/166 (18 December 2014) 
UN Doc A/RES/69/166.
7 OHCHR Report, supra note 3; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson QC’ 
(2014) UN Doc A/69/397; Report of the Special Rapporteur La Rue, supra note 1.
8 Russell Buchan, ‘The International Legal Regulation of State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage’, in Anna 
Maria Osula and Henry Roigas (eds.), International Cyber Norms: Legal, Policy and Industry Perspective 
(NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn 2016) 65-86.
9 The Guardian, ‘ITU and Google Face-off at Dubai Conference over Future of the Internet’ (3 December 
2012).
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3rights law jurisprudence, which in certain circumstances holds a state accountable for human 
rights violations conducted extraterritorially, based on the ‘effective control’ test. It will be 
shown that this model of extraterritorial jurisdiction, currently articulated as physical power or 
control over either an area or a person, is not well suited to the cyber environment and needs 
therefore to be adapted for the transboundary context of digital mass surveillance. A number 
of possible solutions have been proposed by legal scholars, and this paper will outline some 
of their rationales. It will conclude that the exercise of power or authority over an individual’s 
right to privacy through ‘virtual control’ over their communications may constitute a workable 
way forward in preventing states from avoiding their human rights responsibilities ‘simply by 
refraining from bringing those powers within the bounds of the law’.10
2. HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN CYBERSPACE
Efforts to construct a global coordination and policy-making framework for the Internet began 
in the mid-1990s and to date remain unsuccessful.11 There is no single state, or international 
body formally in overall charge of ensuring compliance with the law in respect of the way the 
Internet works.12 Nor is there an overall treaty applicable to the Internet, although there are 
national laws and international treaties that are applicable to activities on the Internet.13 In 
the context of international security, a broad consensus has been reached by the UN Group of 
Governmental Experts that, in principle, international law and in particular the Charter of the 
United Nations apply in cyberspace.14 The UN Human Rights Council, in adopting Resolutions 
in 2012, 2014 and 2016,15 together with the UN General Assembly (GA) adopting Resolutions 
in 2013 and 2014 on the right to privacy in the digital age, have asserted that international 
human rights law applies as much offline as online.16 To that end, Resolution 69/166 called 
upon member states to review their practices and legislation on the interception and collection 
of personal data, including mass surveillance, to ensure the full and effective implementation 
of their obligations under international human rights law. Resolution 28/16 in 2015 also urged 
states to provide ‘an effective remedy’ and encouraged the Human Rights Council to identify 
‘principles, standards and best practice’ for protection of privacy.17
The protection of human rights online has been a subject of international Internet governance18 
discourse for some time, including during the World Summit for the Information Society in 
2003 and 2005. Not until the Snowden revelations, however, did the need for increased privacy 
protection gain importance and, subsequently, calls for the setting of international norms in 
10 Supra note 3, para 33.
11 Milton Mueller, et al. ‘The Internet and Global Governance: Principles and Norms of a New Regime’ 
(2007) 13 Global Governance.
12 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Rule of Law on the Internet and in the Wider 
Digital World’ (2014), 36.
13 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (23 November 2001) ETS No 185; Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1 October 1985) ETS 108.
14 UNGA, ‘Report by Group of Governmental Experts on Development in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’ (24 June 2013) UN Doc A/68/98; UN Doc 
A/70/174 (22 July 2015).
15 UNHRC Res A/HRC/RES/20/8 (16 July 2012); UNHRC Res A/HRC/RES/26/13 (14 July 2014); UNHRC 
Res A/HRC/RES/32/13 (18 July 2016).
16 UNGA Res 68/167 (n 6).
17 UNGA Res 28/16 (26 March 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/16.
18 For a definition of Internet governance, see World Summit on Information Society, ‘Tunis Agenda for 
Information Society’ (2005) WSIS-05/Tunis/Doc/6(Rev. 1), 4. 
4relation to the interception of communications and data protection intensified. In 2013, the 
President of the Republic of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, made a compelling case for the creation 
of ‘multilateral mechanisms for the worldwide network that are capable of ensuring principles 
such as freedom of expression, privacy of individuals and respect for human rights’.19 Germany, 
leading a coalition of states, also proposed to enshrine digital privacy in an international human 
rights treaty by means of a new additional protocol to Article 17 ICCPR for the ‘digital sphere’.20  
The idea, put forward at the 35th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners, was overwhelmingly supported by most of the privacy authorities, except 
for the United States (US).21 Nevertheless, the opening of the negotiations on the additional 
protocol to Article 17 ICCPR conducted by the Special Rapporteur on Privacy, Professor 
Cannataci has begun.22 The additional protocol is not envisaged, however, as ‘one new global 
all-encompassing international convention covering all of privacy or Internet governance’.23 
The Special Rapporteur adopted a realistic approach, expecting that protection of privacy could 
be increased by incremental growth of international law through the clarification and eventually 
the extension of existing legal instruments. This seems to be a pragmatic solution, bearing 
in mind the number of unsuccessful attempts to reach an international agreement regarding 
the setting out of norms regulating state behaviour in cyberspace, in particular those of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2011 and 2015 introducing the International Code of 
Conduct for Information Security24 to the UN General Assembly.
3. MODERNISING ARTICLE 17 ICCPR
In 1988, at the time when the General Comment No.1625 on Article 17 ICCPR was adopted, 
the impact of advances in information and communication technologies on the right to 
privacy was barely understood, as the Internet was in its infancy. The paradigm shift in the 
way we communicate and the aggressive collection of personal information by many states 
have significantly undermined this right in recent decades. Consequently, there have been a 
number of calls for the Human Rights Committee (HRC) to draft a new general comment, 
most notably from UN Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue,26 by the General Assembly,27 and by 
civil society.28 There are a number of reasons for updating General Comment No.16, and the 
fundamental starting point of this process must be articulating what the right to privacy actually 
19 Statement by H.E. Dilma Rousseff, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the Opening of the 
General Debate of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (24 September 2013).
20 Ryan Gallagher, ‘After Snowden Leaks, Countries Want Digital Privacy Enshrined in Human Rights 
Treaty’, Slate (26 September 2013).
21 35th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Resolution on Anchoring 
Data Protection and the Protection of Privacy in International Law, (23-26 September 2013).
22 UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci’ (8 March 2016) 
UN Doc A/HRC/31/64 para 46(j).
23 Ibid.
24 UNGA International Code of Conduct for Information Security (14 September 2011) UN Doc A/66/359; 
UNGA, ‘Letter Dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representative of China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Addressed to the 
Secretary General’ (2015) UN Doc A/69/723.
25 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No.16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy). The Right to Respect of Privacy, 
Family, Home and Correspondence and Protection of Honour and Reputation’ (8 April 1988) UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.
26 UNHRC (n 1).
27 UNGA Res 68/167 (n 6).
28 UNHRC ‘Written Statement by Reporters Without Borders International, a Non-Governmental 
Organisation in Special Consultative Status’ (4 September 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/24/NGO/31.
5means and protects, together with the scope of extraterritorial obligations of states under the 
human rights treaties. Both of these aspects will be discussed in turn below.
A. The Meaning of Privacy 
The first step in modernising Article 17 must be the development of a better, more detailed and 
universal understanding of what is meant by ‘right to privacy’ in the 21st century.29 The absence 
of a universally agreed and accepted definition, and the different rates of economic development 
and technology deployment in diverse geographical locations, mean that the principles relating 
to privacy that were established fifty years ago at the time of drafting the ICCPR need to be 
further developed and supplemented to make them more relevant and useful to the realities of 
the modern era.30 The debate on the understanding of what privacy is and should be has only 
just begun. However, some aspects for discussion regarding this concept have been put forward 
by the Special Rapporteur Cannataci as a useful starting point. Several countries, including 
Brazil and Germany, have written into their constitutions an overarching fundamental right to 
dignity and to free, unhindered development of an individual’s personality.31 Existing rights 
such as privacy, freedom of expression and freedom of access to information also constitute 
a tripod of enabling rights and, together with the fundamental right to dignity and the free 
and unhindered development of one’s personality, would help to articulate how the concept of 
privacy should be understood in the modern age.
The definition of privacy must also encompass the idea of autonomy and self-determination, 
which in some countries such as Germany gives rise to a constitutional right to ‘information 
self-determination’.32 This idea is also referred to as ‘informational privacy’ and is concerned 
with the interest of individuals in exercising control over access to information about 
themselves.33 This is in part already reflected in the current general comment to Article 17, 
according to which ‘the gathering and holding of personal information on computers, databanks 
and other devices by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by 
law’.34 The Human Rights Committee has applied this framework in several of its Concluding 
Observations35 and this practice is also present in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). The Court has held that the notion of ‘private life’ is ‘not susceptible 
to exhaustive definition’36 and has found on numerous occasions that ‘protection of personal 
data is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of respect for his or her personal 
data and family life’.37 Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
explicitly recognises the right to protection of personal data separately and in addition to the 
right to privacy under Article 7.38 In this regard, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) delivered a landmark decision in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner,39 holding 
29 UNHRC (n 22), para 46(a).
30 Ibid.
31 Id., para 25.
32 Ibid.
33 American Civil Liberties Union, ‘Information Privacy in the Digital Age’ (February 2015)
 <https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/informational_privacy_in_the_digital_age_final.pdf>
34 UNHRC (n 25), para 10.
35 UNHRC ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, 
Concluding Observations, Spain’ (2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/ESP/CO/5, para 11. 
36 Bensaid v the United Kingdom (App No 44599/98) (2001) ECHR para 47; Botta v Italy (App No 
21439/93) (1994) ECHR.
37 MK v France (App No 19522/09) (2013) ECHR; S and Marper v the United Kingdom [GC] (App Nos 
30542/04 and 30566/04) (2008) ECHR. 
38 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7 and 8, 2000/C 364/01 (12 December 2000).
39 Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (6 October 2015) Case C-362/14.
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content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter’.40
A new general comment should therefore affirm that Article 17 applies to informational privacy, 
which is understood as the individual’s right to access and control personal data. 
B. Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties
Governments may and do carry out surveillance both within and beyond their borders. However, 
the extent of the mass surveillance abroad, together with the international cooperation and 
the intelligence sharing among the Five Eyes partners, raises questions regarding these states’ 
extraterritorial obligations under international law.
The jurisdictional scope of the ICCPR is set out in Article 2(1) of the Treaty and obliges 
member states ‘to respect and to ensure’ the rights recognised in the treaty ‘to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’.41 Similarly, Article 1 of the ECHR provides 
that state parties must secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the Convention’s rights and 
freedoms.42 The legislative frameworks, pursuant to which global surveillance of the Five 
Eyes operates, make a distinction between external and internal communications (e.g. UK 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA)),43 and the communications of nationals 
and non-nationals.44 These laws differentiate between the obligations owed to nationals and 
those within the state’s territory, and non-nationals who are outside state borders. For example, 
under ss.8 (1) and (2) RIPA, ‘internal’ communications may only be intercepted under a warrant 
which relates to a specific individual or address and may be granted on the basis of a suspicion 
of unlawful activity.45 In cases of interception of ‘external communications’, defined as ‘means 
of communication sent or received outside the British Islands’,46 ss.8(1) and (2) do not apply, 
which means that there is no need to identify any particular person who is to be the subject 
of the interception, or a particular address that will be targeted. The definition of ‘external’ 
communications, by the UK government’s own admission, seems to encompass all activities 
of UK residents conducted through such platforms as Facebook, Twitter and Google, as their 
headquarters are located in the US.47 This gives the UK intelligence agencies carte blanche 
to intercept all communications in and out of the UK, and means that UK residents are being 
deprived of the essential safeguards that would otherwise apply to them. Consequently, both UK 
residents’ and foreigners’ communications may be monitored indiscriminately under a ‘general 
warrant’ on the basis of s.8(4) RIPA 2000. The UN Human Rights Committee commented on 
this differentiation in its 2015 Periodic Report on the United Kingdom, stating that:
 the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), that makes a distinction 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ communications, provides for untargeted warrants 
40 Id., para 94.
41 ICCPR (n 4), art 2(1).
42 ECHR, (n 5), art 1.
43 UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s.8(4); Investigatory Powers Act 2016
 s 136(3); New Zealand Government Security Bureau Act 2003 s.15A.
44 US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 s 1881a(a); Australian Intelligence Services Act 2001 s 9; 
Canadian National Defence Act 1985 s 273.64(1).
45 RIPA, (n 43), s 8(2).
46 Id., s 20.
47 Privacy International v GCHQ, Witness Statement of Charles Blandford Farr on Behalf of the Respondent 
(16 May 2014) IPT/13/92/CH.
7for the interception of external private communications and communication data, 
which are sent or received outside the United Kingdom without affording the same 
safeguards as in the case of interception of internal communications.48
The HRC urged the UK to:
 review the regime regulating the interception of personal communications and 
retention of communications data …with the view to ensuring that such activities both 
within and outside the State party, conform to its obligations under the [International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights], including Article 17.49
Despite this recommendation, the new Investigatory Powers Act 2016 s.136(3) which seeks 
to reform the regime under which the UK law enforcement and security agencies perform 
their functions, allows that bulk interception warrants be issued to collect ‘overseas related 
communications’.50
The issue of the extent of the human rights obligations of states’ intelligence agencies 
conducting surveillance in cyberspace remains far from settled. The US government has 
consistently denied that it is bound by its obligations under the ICCPR, which the US ratified in 
1992, with respect of acts done outside its physical territory.51 It is therefore not legally bound 
to comply with the ICCPR in relation to its surveillance over non-US communications, or 
Internet activities. The US government’s positon is that the Covenant obligations are restricted 
to situations when a person is both within a state’s territory and subject to its jurisdiction.52 This 
means that foreigners who do not satisfy both those conditions simultaneously do not benefit 
from the protection of the ICCPR.53
In the context of the UK state cyber surveillance, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), 
which oversees the working methods of the intelligence agencies, has recently considered the 
issue of the extraterritorial human right obligations of the UK in Human Rights Watch and 
Others v The Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Others (HRW 
v Secretary of State).54 The case related to the interception, storage and use of information and 
communications by GCHQ of two groups of applicants – those resident in the UK and those 
who are not. Regarding the latter, the IPT ruled that the UK:
 owes no obligation under Article 8 ECHR to persons [who] are situated outside its 
territory in respect of electronic communications between them, which pass through 
that state.55
48 UNHRC ‘Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland’ (17 August 2015) UN Doc CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7.
49 Ibid.
50 RIPA (n 43).
51 UNHRC ‘Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting’ (24 April 1995) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.1405, para 20; 
UNHRC ‘Consolidation of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant’ (2005) 
UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/3. 
52 Id., para 20. 
53 US Department of State ‘Second and Third Periodic Report of the United States of American to the UN 
Committee on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (21 
October 2005), Annex I.
54 Human Rights Watch Inc. and Others v The Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
and Others [2016] ALL ER (D) 105 (May).
55 Id., [60].
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surveillance under s.8(4) RIPA, do not have a right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR because 
they have not enjoyed a private life in the UK and therefore under Article 1 ECHR the UK is 
under no obligation to respect it.56 In rejecting the extraterritorial application of the ECHR, the 
IPT adopted a conservative approach, based on Bankovic v Belgium57 whereby, as a general 
principle of international law, jurisdictional competence of states is primarily territorial. The 
IPT was thus unwilling to ‘extend the bounds of the UK Courts’ jurisdiction under Art 8’.58
Ultimately, the issue of UK mass cyber surveillance abroad will be for the ECtHR to resolve in 
this and other cases.59 Nonetheless, HRW v Secretary of State and the US consistent rejection of 
the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR obligations highlight the acute lack of transnational 
legislative instruments capable of addressing this issue. Suggestions have been made, however, 
that the ‘effective control’ over digital communications infrastructure, discussed in more detail 
below, may give rise to states’ human rights obligations.60
C. Models of Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR and the ECHR
The jurisdictional competence of a state is primarily territorial.61 However, all major human 
rights courts and bodies, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN HRC, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the ECtHR, agree that in some 
circumstances human right obligations may apply extraterritorially. This means that a state is 
bound by international human rights law in relation to individuals who may be not within its 
borders, but who are under its jurisdiction. To that end, a broadly similar approach, based on 
‘effective control’, has been adopted to determine jurisdiction. Thus, the HRC has held that:
 a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the [International] 
Covenant [of Civil and Political Rights] to anyone within the power, or effective 
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.62
Similarly, the IACHR has established that, to determine whether a person is within a state’s 
jurisdiction or not:
 the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality, or presence within a 
particular geographical area, but on whether under specific circumstances, the State 
observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control.63
In conceptualising when and how the international human rights obligations may arise outside a 
state’s territory, two types of extraterritorial jurisdiction were distinguished, namely the spatial 
and the personal models. The spatial model sees jurisdiction as effective overall control over 
a geographical area, whereas the personal sees it as a physical control over an individual. The 
56 Id. [58].
57 Bankovic and Others v Belgium (App No 52207/99) (2007) 44 EHRR, 57.
58 HRW v Secretary of State (n 54), [58].
59 Big Brother Watch v the United Kingdom (App No 58170/13); 10 Human Rights Organisations v the 
United Kingdom (Index No IOR 60/1415/2015); Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v the 
United Kingdom (App No 62322/14). 
60 OHCHR (n 3), para 34; Emmerson (n 7), para 41.
61 Bankovic (n 57).
62 UNHRC ‘General Comment No. 31. The Nature of the General Obligations Imposed on State Parties to 
the Covenant’ (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add1326 May 2004, para 10.
63 Alexandre v Cuba, Case 11.589, (1999) IACHR Report No. 109/99, para 37. 
9spatial model was articulated by the ECtHR in Loizidou v Turkey,64 where the Court held that 
a state’s responsibility was engaged when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military 
action, it exercised effective control of an area outside its national territory. A similar approach 
was adopted by the ICJ in the Wall Advisory Opinion65 and in DRC v Uganda,66 where it was 
held that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially when a state is occupying territory of another 
state. Whilst the spatial model has its merits, particularly in its clarity and in setting some 
limits on states’ obligations, it also has some drawbacks.67 According to Milanovic, ‘a state is 
perfectly capable of violating the rights of individuals without controlling the actual area’, for 
example by using drones for targeted killing thus dispensing with the need to have troops on 
the ground.68
The jurisprudence of the international human rights courts has also recognised that states have 
human rights obligations when exercising physical control over an individual. In Lopez Burgos 
v Uruguay69 the HRC held that state parties are liable for the actions of their agents on foreign 
territory, as it would be
 unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under Article 2 of the [ICCPR] as 
to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of 
another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.70
In its General Comment No.31, the Committee established that:
 a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone 
within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within 
the territory of the State Party…regardless of the circumstances in which such power 
or effective control was obtained.71
However, by far the most varied jurisprudence regarding the personal model is that of the 
ECtHR. In Al-Skeini v UK72 the Court stressed the primarily territorial nature of jurisdiction 
under the ECHR, but recognised exceptions to that principle, namely where state agents 
exercise authority and control extra-territorially, and when a state exercises effective control 
of an area outside national territory. State agent authority is particularly pertinent in military 
operations where physical authority and control is exercised in formal detention centres, as was 
the case in the British-controlled facilities in Al-Skeini. However, the exercise of authority was 
also held to have occurred outwith a formal detention centre in Öcalan v Turkey.73 The case 
concerned the handover in Kenya to Turkish authorities of an individual suspected in Turkey of 
terrorist-related crimes. The ECtHR noted that he was effectively under Turkish authority and 
64 Loizidou v Turkey (App No 15318/89) (1995) 20 EHRR 99.
65 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Advisory 
Opinion) (2004) ICJ Reports 163.
66 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v 
Uruguay) (2000) ICJ Reports 111. 
67 Marko Milanovic, ‘Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age’ (2015) 56 
Harvard International Law Journal 81, 114-115. 
68 Id., 113.
69 UNHRC Lopez Burgoz v Uruguay, Communications No 52/1979 (17 July 1979) UN Doc CCPR/
C/13/D/52/1979.
70 Id., paras 12.2-12.3.
71 UNHRC (n 62), para 10.
72 Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom [GC] (App No 55721/07) (7 July 2011) ECHR 2011.
73 Öcalan v Turkey (App No 46221/99) (2003) 41 EHRR 985.
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therefore within its jurisdiction, even though Turkish officials at the time of the arrest exercised 
their authority outside Turkey.
In addition, and perhaps most notably, the ECtHR has recognised that the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction on the basis of state agent authority or control is not limited to situations of the 
physical custody of an individual, but may be engaged when state agents exercise authority 
and control over an individual’s rights, as was the case in Jaloud v the Netherlands.74 The 
case concerned the fatal shooting of Azhar Sabah Jaloud, who at the time was passing 
through a checkpoint manned by personnel under the command and direct supervision of a 
Royal Netherlands Army officer in Iraq. The ECtHR found that the Netherlands exercised its 
jurisdiction on the basis that Dutch troops asserted ‘authority and control over persons passing 
through the checkpoint’ because they exercised authority and control over his right to life at 
that moment. This gave rise to extraterritorial jurisdiction, despite not having physical control 
over Mr Jaloud. The case therefore marks the ECtHR moving away from an approach wherein 
jurisdiction is founded on the basis of pure factual authority, towards one based on the exercising 
of authority and control over an individual’s rights. 
D. Applicability of Human Rights Treaties to Extraterritorial Cyber 
Surveillance
If a state may be found to have human rights obligations because it exercises authority and 
control over an individual’s right to life, as proposed in Jaloud, then by analogy the exercise 
of control over their right to privacy of communications should also give rise to extraterritorial 
obligations in cases of foreign cyber surveillance. Such an interpretation seems necessary, 
given that the ‘effective control’ test is unsuitable, outdated and narrow in the context of state-
sponsored cyber surveillance operations.  It is outdated, because it has been articulated by 
international human rights courts and bodies long before digital technologies begun to play 
such a pervasive role in the lives of millions of individuals around the world. The existing 
approach is entirely inadequate for the cyber and communications realm, as it places the 
emphasis on the exercise of physical control over persons or territory, which is difficult to 
relate to cyberspace.75 The shortcomings of the effective control approach centre around the 
fact that some state intelligence services, particularly the NSA, exert effective remote, rather 
than physical, control over much of the communications of foreign nationals abroad.76 This 
occurs through eavesdropping on those communications, filtering, or altering their content, and 
breaking many forms of encryption by installing ‘back doors’ in many software systems.77 The 
NSA also has the capacity to gain control of computers not directly connected to the Internet due 
to implantation of transmitting devices in computers manufactured in the US and elsewhere.78 
In addition, the US has relationships with Internet and telecommunications companies that 
facilitate surveillance, and therefore have the capacity to access directly the undersea cables 
and other carriers of Internet and telephonic communications.79 The US’s virtual power is 
unprecedented,80 and the narrowly defined standard requiring physical control means that states 
interfering with the right to privacy would continue to exploit this gap by circumventing their 
74 Jaloud v the Netherlands (App No 47708/08) (2014). 
75 Peter Margulies, ‘The NSA in the Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights and International 
Counterterrorism’ (2014) 82 Fordham Law Review 2137.
76 Id., 2151.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid.
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human rights obligations. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the ‘effective control’ test must 
be adapted to suit the realities of cyber surveillance operations. 
A number of suggestions have been made, and their overall tenet seems to hinge on the control 
of communications, rather than physical control over areas or individuals. Thus, Nyst argues 
that when data or communications are intercepted within a state’s territory, the state should 
owe obligations to those individuals regardless of their location on the basis of ‘interface-based 
jurisdiction’,81 that is not to interfere with communications that pass through its territorial 
borders.82 This approach is broadly in line with that proposed by Milanovic, who distinguishes 
between the overarching positive obligation of states to secure or ensure human rights, and 
extends even to preventing human rights violations by third parties and negative obligations 
of states to respect human rights that only requires states to refrain from interfering with the 
rights of individuals without sufficient justification.83 This model conceptualises jurisdiction 
as a negative duty to refrain from interference and would apply to all potential violations of 
negative obligations, for example to refrain from interfering with privacy.84 In this sense, 
human rights treaties would apply to most, if not all foreign surveillance activities.85 Both 
these approaches have their merits, in as much as they recognise the weaknesses of the personal 
and spatial models and emphasise the negative duty of states not to interfere with protected 
rights. However, the nature and scope of the Five Eyes surveillance seems to go beyond the 
interception, collection and storage of data. The partnership between the US and its allied 
services allows governments to easily engage in the so-called ‘collusion for circumvention’.86 
For example, GCHQ is allowed to spy on anyone except British nationals, whilst the NSA on 
anyone but Americans.87 Information-sharing partnerships enable each agency to circumvent its 
respective national restrictions protecting their countries’ citizens, since they are able to access 
the data collected by others.88 This reciprocity has important ramifications on the domestic 
level if it is used to circumvent domestic legislation and limits on the governments’ ability 
to tap its own citizens’ communications.89 In this context, the negative duty not to interfere 
with privacy would only be discharged if the interference is also understood as ‘collusion for 
circumvention’, encompassing such information sharing arrangements. 
Given that this is not entirely clear, a sound candidate for a model of jurisdiction may be the 
‘virtual control’ test, proposed by Margulies.90 This test would make the ICCPR and other 
human rights treaties applicable when a state can assert ‘virtual control’ over an individual’s 
communications, even though it lacks control over the territory in which the individual is 
located, or over the ‘physical person’ of that individual.91 ‘Virtual control’ in this context means 
the ability to intercept, store, analyse and use communications. Although it could be argued that 
mere surveillance does not constitute physical control, it may constitute virtual control, in that it 
81 Carly Nyst, ‘Interface Based Jurisdiction Over Violations of the Right to Privacy’ (21 November 2013) 
EJIL:Talk! <http://www.ejiltalk.org/interference-based-jurisdiction-over-violations-of-the-right-to-
privacy/>
82 Ibid.
83 Milanovic (n 67), 126.
84 Ibid.
85 Id., 129.
86 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘Mass Surveillance’ Doc 13734 (18 March 2015), paras 
30-3.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid. 
90 Margulies (n 75), 2139.
91 Ibid. 
12
not only stifles their right to privacy, but also has a chilling effect on other human rights, such as 
free expression, freedom of conscience and religion, free assembly and association, and health, 
to name but a few. It therefore affects and controls individuals’ behaviour.
Although the ‘virtual control’ approach has been criticised for being new and ‘without support 
in patterns of generally shared legal expectations about personal jurisdiction’,92 it has a number 
of advantages. First, it corresponds to the notion of control developed and required by human 
rights courts and bodies,93 outlined above. Secondly, it responds to the jurisdictional challenges 
of human rights obligations in surveillance cases, because the intelligence agencies under 
scrutiny are perfectly capable of controlling lives and private information with the press of the 
button.94 Thirdly, it is in line with the ECtHR reasoning in Jaloud v the Netherlands, where a 
more expansive approach was taken and extraterritorial jurisdiction was established because of 
the state agents’ exercise of authority and control over the individual’s right to life, which made 
their physical proximity unimportant. Fourthly, such an approach would ensure equal treatment 
of all individuals, irrespective of their nationality or physical location, because establishing 
‘virtual control’ over someone’s communications would not depend on where the interference 
takes place, but rather on whether or not a state can assert such control even when it lacks 
authority or control over the territory or the physical person. Finally, it could also mean that 
governments’ ‘collusion for circumvention’ arrangements may fall within their obligations not 
to interfere with the privacy rights, as they would have an obligation derived from the human 
rights treaties in relation to the rights of all individuals whose communications fall within their 
control, either inside and outside their territories. 
It still remains unclear how cyber surveillance may trigger the extraterritorial application of 
human rights law. Although there is a general endorsement from international organisations that 
human rights treaties apply to extraterritorial cyber surveillance, no human rights body has yet 
directly addressed how electronic surveillance affects the right to privacy in detail. The Human 
Rights Committee has engaged with this issue, suggesting that extraterritorial surveillance does 
affect the ICCPR, when addressing the NSA surveillance pursuant to s.702 of FISA, stating 
that:
 the Committee is concerned about the surveillance of communications in the interest 
of protecting national security conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) 
conducted both within and outside the United States.95
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner also addressed extraterritorial surveillance 
noting that:
 digital surveillance […] may engage a State’s human rights obligations if that 
surveillance involves the State’s exercise of power or effective control in relation 
to digital communications infrastructure, wherever found, for example through 
92 Jordan J. Paust, ‘Can You Hear Me Now? Private Communications, National Security and the Human 
Rights Disconnect’ (2015) 15(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 612(2015), 625.
93 Ilina Georgieva, ‘The Right to Privacy under Fire-Foreign Surveillance under the NSA and the GCHQ and 
Its Compatibility with Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 8 ECHR’ (2015) 31(80) Utrecht Journal of International and 
European Law 104.
94 Ibid.
95 UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America’ (23 
April 2014) CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, para 22. 
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direct tapping or penetration of that infrastructure. Equally, where the State exercises 
regulatory jurisdiction over a third party that physically controls the data, that State 
also would have obligations under the Covenant.96
Similarly, the Special Rapporteur Emmerson observed that the:
 State’s jurisdiction is not only engaged where State agents place data interceptors 
on fibre-optic cables travelling through their jurisdictions, but also where a State 
exercises regulatory authority over the telecommunications or Internet service 
providers that physically control the data.97
The United Nations General Assembly, in adopting Resolution 68/167, appears to support the 
view that the ICCPR applies to extraterritorial surveillance, expressing its deep concern:
 at the negative impact that surveillance […] including extraterritorial surveillance 
[…] in particular when carried out on a mass scale may have on the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights.98
These approaches seem to broadly correspond with legal academic opinion articulating 
jurisdiction being triggered on the basis of states’ control over the individual’s rights to 
privacy. However, they leave unanswered the question of what degree of control is necessary to 
establish that a state exercises ‘power or effective control in relation to digital communications 
infrastructure’. In Jaloud the ECtHR indicated its approach to the issues of authority and 
control based on the actual exercise of such powers over an individual’s rights. Whether or not 
it will apply this or a similar approach to the pending surveillance cases99 remains to be seen.
There can be no doubt that, as currently defined, the ‘effective control’ test of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is not well suited for application to cyber surveillance operations. Cyberspace 
is a transnational environment where information is deliberately routed through a number 
of jurisdictions to reach its destination. When interference is conducted remotely, physical 
control over an area or an individual ceases to be relevant. At the very least, it leaves a gap that 
intelligence agencies can exploit to circumvent the obligations under the human rights treaties 
through the use of intelligence sharing agreements. What becomes important in this context is 
the ‘virtual control’ over the individuals’ right to privacy, regardless of where they are located 
or their nationality. How these obligations may apply to cases of cyber surveillance remains 
unclear, especially bearing in mind the ‘inevitable ripple effects on other scenarios such as 
extraterritorial use of lethal force through, for example drone strikes’,100 if more permissive 
approach to this issue were to be adopted. This makes the task of the Human Rights Committee 
when drafting new general comment on Article 17 particularly challenging. 
96 OHCHR (n 3), para 34. 
97 Emmerson (n 7), para 41. 
98 UNGA Res 68/167 (n 6).
99 Listed at note 59.
100 Marko Milanovic ‘UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules that Non-UK Residents Have No Right to 
Privacy under the ECHR’ (2016) EJIL: Talk!
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4. CONCLUSION
In the age of increased terrorist threat, the balance between the need for security and the 
right to privacy of innocent individuals is particularly difficult to achieve. The vulnerability 
of this and other rights in the face of an unprecedented interference by states’ intelligence 
agencies conducting mass surveillance must be addressed. This paper concentrated on 
one legal solution – the overhaul of Article 17 ICCPR, and in particular re-defining the 
concept of privacy and addressing the question of how and when states may be liable under 
international law for their surveillance activities, the effect of which may be felt beyond their 
borders. The paper has illustrated that the narrowly defined territorial limitations on human 
rights protection based on nationality (e.g. s.702 FISA), or geographical distinctions (s 8(4) 
RIPA; s.136 IPA) are meaningless when applied to highly integrated global communications 
networks. The surveillance conducted on these legal bases, coupled with the states’ ‘collusion 
for circumvention’ places practically no limitation on the extent to which governments can 
access the communications of millions of individuals in their own and other countries. Yet the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights is not limited to citizens of particular states, but includes all 
individuals, regardless of nationality. Although the jurisprudence of the international human 
rights courts recognises that there are certain circumstances when extraterritorial human rights 
obligations will be engaged based on the ‘effective control’ test, this paper has highlighted its 
limitations in the context of cyber surveillance and has proposed that the ‘virtual control’ test 
– understood as a remote control over an individual’s right to privacy – may be a solution to 
this problem. 
